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The Happiness-Income Paradox Revisited 
 
The striking thing about the happiness-income paradox is that over the long-term – usually a 
period of 10 y or more – happiness does not increase as a country’s income rises. Heretofore 
the evidence for this was limited to developed countries. This article presents evidence that 
the long term nil relationship between happiness and income holds also for a number of 
developing countries, the eastern European countries transitioning from socialism to 
capitalism, and an even wider sample of developed countries than previously studied. It also 
finds that in the short-term in all three groups of countries, happiness and income go 
together, i.e., happiness tends to fall in economic contractions and rise in expansions. Recent 
critiques of the paradox, claiming the time series relationship between happiness and income 
is positive, are the result either of a statistical artifact or a confusion of the short-term 
relationship with the long-term one. 
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 Introduction 
 
  Simply stated, the happiness-income paradox is this: at a point in time both among and 
within nations happiness varies directly with income, but over time happiness does not 
increase when a country’s income increases.  We are talking here about the time series 
relationship of happiness and income in the long-term, usually at least ten years, 
sometimes more.  As we shall see, the short-term relationship is a different story. 
   First reported for the United States almost four decades ago (1,2) the empirical scope 
of the paradox has been gradually broadening to include Japan and nine developed 
countries of Europe in 1995 (3), and now, in this article to 17 Latin American countries, 
17 developed countries, 11 eastern European countries transitioning from socialism to 
capitalism, and 9 less developed countries scattered across Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa, including some with quite low growth rates and some with the highest rates of 
economic growth ever observed.  In addition to providing this broader range of time 
series evidence on the happiness-income paradox, the results of research carried on at 
the University of Southern California over the past five years, this article rebuts recent 
claims that the relationship is, in fact, positive, not nil, and contributes new evidence of 
the short- as well as long-term happiness-income relationship.   
   Our measures of happiness are life satisfaction (LS) and for the 17 Latin American 
countries, financial satisfaction (FS). Although questions on life satisfaction were asked 
in the Latin American countries, the question or response categories changed several 
times, making the life satisfaction data unusable for time series analysis.  Although FS 
is a less comprehensive measure of well-being than LS, it relates directly to economic 
well-being; hence one would expect it to be more closely related to income change, the 
annual rate of change in real GDP per capita (hereafter, simply designated GDP). We 
use the term subjective well-being (SWB) to encompass both LS and FS. Our principal data sources are the Latinobarometer (LB) from Corporacion Latinobarometro 
(www.latinobarometro.org) and the World Values Survey (WVS) from the World 
Values Survey Association and the European Values Study Foundation 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org and www.europeanvalues.nl) though we did use other 
sources as well, most notably the Eurobarometer from GESIS (www.zacat.gesis.org) for 
many of the developed nations.  
 
Results 
Though the product of a number of woman-and-man-years of work, the results turn out 
to be highly consistent and are quite concisely summarized. 
   1. For 17 Latin American countries, with annual time series for 1994-2006 of 10-12 
years in length, the relationship between the annual growth rate of GDP and the average 
annual change in financial satisfaction (in absolute terms on a scale of 1-5) is nil. 
[Figure 1] The economic growth rates of these countries range from about -1 to 3 
percent per year.  Today’s developed countries, at a comparable stage of development in 
the nineteenth century, typically averaged around 1 to 1.5 percent.  In the recent 
experience of Latin America, it makes no difference whether a country’s economic 
growth rate is high or low, one cannot predict the long-term change in financial 
satisfaction from an OLS regression analysis on the GDP data for these countries in this 
period.  The slope coefficient of the regression does not differ in statistical significance 
from zero.  This finding of a nil relationship is contrary to economists’ usual 
expectation that growth and well-being would be positively related, and also to what 
one would expect from point-of-time cross section studies (1-8).  It is consistent, 
however with the findings of the previous time series studies of the happiness-income 
relationship cited above.     2. For a worldwide sample of 37 countries with intermittent life satisfaction data (1-10 
scale) for periods ranging from 12 to 34 years (mean=22) up to 2005, there is no 
significant relation between the improvement in life satisfaction and the rate of 
economic growth. [Figure 2] The growth rates of GDP per capita here are representative 
of developing countries generally, typically ranging from slightly negative to almost 6 
per cent.  If the one outlier, China, at almost 10 percent is omitted, the regression 
coefficient is still not significant.   
   Figure 2 is for the composite of three groups of countries – developed, transition, and 
developing.  Regressions for each of the groups separately yield results quite similar to 
those in Figure 2, with slope coefficients that do not differ significantly from zero, and 
for two of the three country groups, they are negatively signed, as in Figure 2.  If a 
higher rate of economic growth raises financial and life satisfaction more rapidly, it is 
hard to find evidence of it among 17 Latin American countries, or in the richer, poorer, 
and transition countries studied here.   
 
Recent critiques of the Paradox 
Two types of evidence are claimed to contradict the time series findings of no relation 
between economic growth and happiness.  The first, which is puzzling, to say the least, 
is cross section (point-of-time) evidence of a positive happiness-income relationship.  In 
the economics of happiness literature this positive relationship has been well-accepted 
for several decades (1-10), but it is a graph based on country data from the 2006 Gallup 
World Poll in a 2008 article by Angus Deaton, that seems to have registered with the 
economics profession in general (11).  This graph, which is headed “Each Doubling of 
GDP Is Associated with a Constant Increase in Life Satisfaction” has been cited by both 
economists and non-economists as disproof of the happiness-income paradox (12, 13, 14).  It is even cited in this vein in the recent Sarkozy Report (15), a landmark study, 
most notably in the advocacy by a group of renowned economists of the use of 
subjective measures of well-being such as life satisfaction for designing public policies 
and assessing social progress.   
   The essential meaning of “paradox”, however, is the seeming contradiction between 
the first clause and the second – in this case, between the cross section and time series 
results.  That scholars would cite Deaton’s cross section results as disproving the time 
series finding is to ignore the very meaning of paradox.  If there were no positive 
relation in the cross section, there would be no paradox! 
   In  contrast,  critiques  based  on  time  series findings claiming that the relationship 
between happiness and income is, in fact, positive must be taken seriously.  The first, a 
2003 study by Hagerty and Veenhoven (16) has been previously critiqued by Easterlin 
(17), and these criticisms, which reject the claim of a positive relationship, have been 
acknowledged by Hagerty and Veenhoven to be correct (18).   
   The second is an article by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators (19) who suggest 
that the life satisfaction and happiness measures in the WVS reflect different 
determinants, the former, economic conditions, and the latter, political circumstances.  
They argue that “many ex-communist countries experienced democratization 
accompanied by economic collapse, resulting in rising happiness and falling life 
satisfaction” (p.277). The upward trend in happiness that they report, however, appears 
to result from a “primacy bias” in the happiness data due to a change in instructions to 
the interviewers between adjacent waves of the survey data they use.  In one wave, 
interviewers were instructed to alternate the order of response choices from one 
respondent to the next.  Thus respondent 1 would be presented with choices ranging 
from “very happy” down to “not at all happy,” while respondent 2 would be presented with “not at all happy” first.  There are a number of survey studies demonstrating a 
tendency for respondents to favor earlier over later choices (20,21,22).  In this wave, 
therefore, half the respondents would have been more inclined toward less happy 
choices by virtue of being presented with the more negative options first.  In the next 
wave, however, the “very happy” option appears first, and the instruction to alternate 
response options no longer appears.  Hence happiness responses in this wave would 
tend to be biased upward relative to the preceding wave.  No such change in instructions 
occurs in regard to the life satisfaction data, and this is why, in using the same data set 
here in Figure 2 as Inglehart and his collaborators, we rely on the life satisfaction 
measure and disregard happiness. 
      In fact, life satisfaction and happiness typically move together over time not in 
different directions and they do so in conjunction with democratization.  As a striking 
example, consider the experience of South Africa when democracy was established 
there.  In May 1994, one month after the country’s first democratic election, a survey 
was conducted that included questions about both happiness and life satisfaction.  Table 
1 presents for both measures the percentage of the black population in the top two (out 
of five) categories at that time and the corresponding percentage at the two adjacent 
dates when similar surveys were conducted.  Note how by both measures the well-being 
of blacks soared at the time of the election.  But as noted sociologist Valerie Møller, 
who kindly provided these data, observes: “[P]ost-election euphoria was short lived.  
Satisfaction levels have since returned to ones reminiscent of those under the former 
regime.”(23) This return is registered by both SWB measures.  Moreover, the 
magnitude of rise and fall is virtually identical for the two measures.  This is striking 
evidence, indeed, of the tendency for happiness and life satisfaction to move together, 
not differently.      The third and most serious critique based on time series data is in a 2008 article by 
Stevenson and Wolfers (24). The main problem with the Stevenson and Wolfers (S-W) 
analysis is that they, in fact, estimate a positive short-term relationship between life 
satisfaction and GDP, rather than the long-term relationship, which is nil.  That life 
satisfaction and GDP tend to vary together in contractions and expansions has already 
been demonstrated for a group of developed countries (25), and micro-level evidence 
consistently shows that unemployment has one of the most negative impacts on 
happiness (4,8,10).  Before proceeding to further discussion of S-W, we expand here 
this finding of the short-term relationship to the developing and transition countries.  
   We return to the Latin American data of Figure 1, the best for the short term analysis 
of developing countries because it is yearly (26).  For both financial satisfaction and 
GDP we fit OLS trend lines over the full time span available for each country, and then 
compute the deviation at each date of the actual value from the trend value.  Pooling the 
deviations for all 17 countries, we find that when GDP is above trend, financial 
satisfaction tends to be above trend; when GDP is below trend, financial satisfaction 
tends to be below – in short that the deviations for FS and GDP are significantly 
positively related. [Figure 3] 
   Moreover, the deviations exhibit a synchronous movement in the 17 countries; in a 
year when one country is below trend, almost all the others are.  We therefore compute 
for both financial satisfaction and GDP the mean of the deviations for the 17 countries 
in each year.  The GDP time series of mean deviations exhibits a clear pattern of 
collapse and recovery over the period, reflecting, in fact, the world crisis precipitated by 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 which was followed by a 1998 Russian crisis. [Figure 
4].  The latter especially affected commodity prices and had a great impact throughout 
Latin America.  What is noteworthy is that the financial satisfaction time series of mean deviations exhibits a similar movement to GDP of collapse and recovery.  Note that if 
one analyzes only the period 1998-2003 or 2003-2006, one concludes that happiness 
and income move together.  But if one considers the entire period of contraction and 
expansion, as we do above in Figure 1, the happiness-income relation is nil.  Clearly in 
this group of developing countries financial satisfaction and GDP are positively related 
in the short-term, but, as seen in the analysis in Figure 1, not in the long-term.   
   For the transition countries we present time series of life satisfaction and GDP for 
three of the countries for which the data encompass the onset of the transition [Figure 
5].  The pattern is clearly like that in Figure 4, a positive relationship in the short-term.  
The timing of the two series is closest for the GDR, where we have annual data for both 
series.  For Estonia and the Russian Federation, for which only intermittent life 
satisfaction data are available, one finds both life satisfaction and GDP with a similar V-
shaped pattern.  If the GDP observations are confined to those for which life satisfaction 
is also available, the timing pattern becomes even more similar.  This synchronous V-
shaped movement of both life satisfaction and GDP is typical of the transition countries 
for which data encompassing the onset of transition are available, but if trend lines are 
fitted that span both the contraction and expansion periods, we find that the long-term 
relationship is nil (as discussed in connection with Figure 2), in contrast to the short-
term positive relationship (27).   Some analysts, who use data that do not include the 
contraction phase, mistakenly take the positive happiness-income relation during the 
expansion as indicative of the long-term trend. 
   To return to the Stevenson and Wolfers analysis, based on a regression analysis of 
data from the WVS source we use here in Figure 2, S-W report a positive relation 
between the change in life satisfaction and the growth rate of GDP.  (We focus on their 
life satisfaction analysis, not happiness.  As explained above there is reason to believe the WVS happiness data are biased upward due to a statistical artifact).  Specifically, 
Stevenson and Wolfers report the results of three “short first differences” and three 
“long first differences” regressions (pp. 39-41).  The 5-6 year time spans of the former 
are too brief to identify the long-term relation between life satisfaction and GDP.  (This 
is much like taking for analysis either the contraction or expansion periods of Figure 4).  
Of the remaining three, only two have a statistically significant positive coefficient.  
The first (based on observations for 32 countries) is due to the inclusion chiefly of the 
recovery phase in 11 transition countries, rather than the complete collapse and recovery 
of life satisfaction and GDP in these countries (illustrated for three of them in Figure 5).  
If the transition countries are omitted from the regression, the coefficient is no longer 
significant.  The other significantly positive regression coefficient, based on an analysis 
of 17 countries, is due entirely to two observations.  The first is that for Hungary, with 
low growth in GDP and a negative change in life satisfaction. (Hungary is the one 
transition country with a data point as early as 1981; the observation for Hungary in this 
S-W regression analysis is based on the contraction phase of life satisfaction and GDP). 
The other observation is for a developing country, South Korea, with very high growth 
in GDP (it is off-scale in the S-W diagram), and high growth in life satisfaction. (More 
later on South Korea’s trend in life satisfaction).  If these two countries are excluded 
from the regression analysis, there is no significant relation in the remaining countries 
(all of which are developed) between the change in life satisfaction and that in GDP. 
Thus, the findings of a positive relationship by Stevenson and Wolfers rest almost 
entirely on the short-term positive association between life satisfaction and GDP in the 
transition countries, seen above in Figure 5.  Regression lines encompassing both the 
contraction and expansion periods in these countries reveal a nil relation between life 
satisfaction and GDP (27).   Stevenson and Wolfers also report that their typical cross section slope 
coefficient of 0.3 to 0.4 from regression analysis does not differ in statistical 
significance from their typical time series coefficient.  This result is almost certainly due 
to the fact that their time series coefficient is much too high, because it reflects the 
positive short-term association between life satisfaction and GDP.  Using the long-term 
coefficients estimated here in Figures 1 and 2, we find a statistically significant 
difference between these coefficients and Stevenson and Wolfer’s typical cross section 
coefficient.  Moreover, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, our regression coefficients do not 
differ significantly from zero. 
 
Discussion 
This article contributes the broadest range of evidence yet assembled demonstrating that 
over time a higher rate of economic growth does not result in a greater increase of 
happiness.  The evidence encompasses 17 Latin American countries and, from a 
different data set, 17 developed countries, 11 countries transitioning from socialism to 
capitalism, and 9 developing countries, four of which are also in the Latin American 
data set.  
   Given the wide range of countries we were studying – rich and poor, ex-communist 
and capitalist, spread across five continents – we started with no preconceptions as to 
the likely outcome.  In the end the results, from two quite different data sources, were 
strikingly consistent.  
   This article also contributes the first systematic evidence for developing and transition 
countries that short-term contractions and expansions are accompanied by 
corresponding movements in subjective well-being.  Thus, in the short-term, happiness 
and SWB are positively related, but over the long-term – here, usually a minimum period of ten years – the relationship is nil.  The happiness-income paradox now holds 
for countries ranging from poor to rich: among countries at a point in time happiness 
and income are positively related, but over time within a country happiness does not 
increase as income goes up.   
   The reasons for the paradoxical happiness-income relation in the long run, and why 
the short-term relationship is positive are beyond the scope of this article.  But clearly, 
the escalation of material aspirations with economic growth, reflecting the impact of 
social comparison and hedonic adaptation, are of central importance (26, 27, 28, 29).  
No evidence has been forthcoming to suggest that poorer countries are somehow 
exempt from escalating material aspirations as income rises.     
   We have also considered here recent studies claiming to rebut the happiness-income 
paradox.  One such case is where the first part of the paradox, the positive cross section 
relationship, is said to disprove the second, the nil time series relationship.  This is, to 
say the least, a puzzling bit of logic, flying in the face of the very meaning of paradox.  
If there were no positive cross section relationship, there would be no paradox. 
      More pertinent are two recent time series findings purporting to show a positive 
happiness-income relationship.  The result of the first study (19), however, is due to a 
statistical artifact.  That of the second (24) arises from confusing the positive short-term 
association between happiness and income, which is what is estimated in the article, 
with the long-term relation, which the article does not estimate. 
      Although we have worked over the data used here to try to produce the most 
comparable time series possible (30), we make no claim to infallibility.  But the fact that 
the surveys now available fail to pick up a positive long-term happiness-income 
relationship in countries exhibiting a wide disparity in economic growth rates is, to say 
the least, remarkable.  Consider, for example, three countries included here with very high recent growth rates of GDP – China, South Korea, and Chile.  China’s growth rate 
implies a doubling of real per capita income in less than 10 years; South Korea’s, in 13 
years; and Chile’s, in 18 years.  With the real per capita amount of goods multiplying so 
rapidly in a fraction of a lifetime, one might think many of the people in these countries 
would be so happy, they’d be dancing in the streets.  Yet both China and Chile show 
mild (not statistically significant) declines in life satisfaction – China in surveys 
conducted by three different statistical organizations.  South Korea, none of whose 
surveys have been faulted, shows a (not statistically significant) increase.  All of the 
increase, however, results from a low life satisfaction value reported in the initial 
survey, one that was conducted a few months after the assassination of the country’s 
president in 1980.  Thereafter, in four surveys from 1990 to 2005, a period when per 
capita GDP continued to grow rapidly, averaging 5 percent per year, life satisfaction 
declines slightly (though the decline is not statistically significant).  With incomes rising 
so rapidly in these three different countries, it seems extraordinary that there are no 
surveys that register the marked improvement in subjective well-being that mainstream 
economists and policy makers worldwide would expect to find. 
      Where does this leave us? If economic growth is not the main route to greater 
happiness, what is? A simple, but unhelpful answer, is that more research is needed.  
Possibly more useful are studies that point to the need to focus policy more directly on 
urgent personal concerns relating to such things as health and family life and to the 
formation of material preferences (28), rather than on the mere escalation of material 
goods.       
  
Materials and Methods    The data underlying Figures 1, 3 and 4 are from the Latinobarometer (LB) conducted 
almost annually since 1995 in 17 countries throughout Latin America.  Prior to 2003, 
the LB survey coverage of smaller places in some countries was very uneven.  For this 
reason, we confined our time series analysis to places of 100,000 population or more in 
the following countries: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Uruguay.  The remaining countries, for which the data for places of 100,000 
population were used in the early survey years for which the coverage of small places 
was particularly poor, and the national values were employed thereafter, are: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.  
(In point of fact, the reported national values for FS in these countries do not differ 
much from those for places of 100,000 population or more). 
   The data principally underlying Figures 2 and 5 are from the World Values Survey, 
conducted in an increasing number of countries throughout the world in five waves: 
1981-84, 1989-93, 1994-99, 1999-2004 and 2005-2007, and the Eurobarometer surveys 
conducted between 1973 and 2006.  Of the developing countries included here, the 
following were first surveyed in wave 2, and thus have 4 time series observations: 
Brazil, Chile, China, South Africa, and Turkey.  Four developing countries were first 
surveyed in wave 1 and have 5 time series observations: Argentina, Japan (whose initial 
time series observation puts it well within the developing bloc), Mexico and South 
Korea. When possible we check our data against other surveys (China, Japan and South 
Africa).  The eleven transition countries comprise Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, and Slovakia.  The 17 developed countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United States. For the United States, the data are from the General Social Survey from the National Opinion 
Research Center
1. For Australia and Canada they are from the World Values Survey. 
Times series happiness data for Norway were kindly provided by Professor Ottar 
Hellevik. The rest of the developed countries were surveyed as part of the 
Eurobarometer.  The GDP data are those of the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (http://go.worldbank.org/IW6ZUUHUZ0), from 1975 onwards.  
      We date the observations on subjective well-being (SWB) here, not at the actual 
survey dates, but to match the annual GDP observations that they most likely represent.  
The GDP dates are for calendar years while the SWB surveys typically relate to only 
one or a few months at various points in a year; hence an SWB survey in the first part of 
the year is likely to reflect economic conditions in the previous year. 
   The LB question on financial satisfaction is: How would you define, in general, the 
current economic situation of your family?  Would you say it is 1=very good, 2=good, 
3=regular, 4=bad, 5=very bad.  We recoded the responses to go from 5=very good on 
down.  The WVS question on life satisfaction is: All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these days?  Please use this order to help your answer: 
1  Dissatisfied  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Satisfied 
   We compute the long term growth rate of SWB by regressing it on time, taking as our 
period of analysis for each country the largest time span available (minimum, 10 years 
for LB, 12 years for WVS).  The long term growth rate of GDP is computed from the 
GDP per capita values at the start and end of the period covered by the SWB 
observations.  Growth rates for both SWB and GDP are per year; the change in SWB is 
                                                 
1 Davis JA, Smith TW. General Social Surveys 1972-2008. Principal Investigator Davis JA, 
Director and Co-Principal Investigator Smith TW, Co-Principal Investigator Marsden PV.  NORC 
ed. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, producer, 2005; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, distributor. measured in absolute terms, that in GDP in percentage terms (hence the use of log 
GDP).   
   In taking long periods for analysis the purpose is specifically to distinguish the longer 
from the shorter term relationship.  The ordinary least squares regressions in Figures 1 
and 2 are for the rate of change in SWB (absolute amount) regressed on the log GDP 
per capita.  The methods underlying Figures 3 and 4 are detailed in the text.  Figure 5 is 
a plot of the absolute value of life satisfaction and an index of real GDP per capita 
(1989=100). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.  Percentage of black population in top two response categories of 
happiness and of life satisfaction: South Africa 1988, 1994, 1995 
 
  1988 1994 1995 
Happiness 32  80  39 
Life 
Satisfaction 
37 86 45 
 
Source: South Africa Quality of Life trends Study commissioned to Mark Data. We are 
grateful to Prof. Valerie Møller for providing these data to us. The survey samples are 
weighted to be representative of the actual black population. 
 
Figure 1. Average annual rate of change in Financial Satisfaction and in GDP per 
capita, 17 Latin American countries, 1994-2006 
 
 
The fitted OLS regression is: y = -.255 x + 0.12   (adj R
2=-0.05); t-stats in parentheses. 
                                     (0.5)       (1.42) 
  
Figure 2. Average annual rate of change in Life Satisfaction and in GDP per 
capita, 17 developed, 11 transition, and 9 developing countries 
 
 
The fitted OLS  regression is: y= –0.003 x + 0.018 (adj R
2=0.069); t-stats in 
parentheses.                                    (-1.61)        (3.07) 
 
Figure3. Deviations from trend in Financial Satisfaction and in log GDP per 
capita, 17 Latin American countries (n=175), 1994-2006 
 
 
For each country the plotted values are the deviations of the actual magnitude in a given 
year (Table A-1) from the trend value for that year as given by the regression equations 
in Tables 1 and 2.  The fitted OLS regression is y = 2.11x  (adj R
2=0.31); t-stats in 
parentheses.                       (8.86) 
 
  
Figure4. Mean deviation in Financial Satisfaction and in log GDP per capita, 17 
Latin American countries, annually 1994-2006 
 
 
See text for methods.  
Figure5. Life Satisfaction and Annual Index of Real GDP, 3 transition countries, 
1989-2005 
 
 
Source: 30. 
 
 